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Abstract
This paper investigates behavior in the Traveler's Dilemma game
and isolates deviations from textbook predictions caused by di®erences
in welfare perceptions and strategic miscalculations. It presents the
results of an experimental analysis based on a 2x2 design where the
own and the other subject's bonus-penalty parameters are changed
independently. We ¯nd that the change in own bonus-penalty alone
entirely explains the e®ect on claims of a simultaneous change in one's
own and the other's bonus-penalty. An increase in the other subject's
bonus-penalty has a signi¯cant negative e®ect on claims when the own
bonus-penalty is low, whereas it does not have a signi¯cant e®ect when
the own bonus-penalty is high. We also ¯nd that expected claims are
inconsistent with actual claims in the asymmetric treatments. Focus-
ing on reported strategies, we document substantial heterogeneity and
show that changes in choices across treatments are to a large extent
explained by risk aversion.
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11 Introduction
There is now a substantial body of laboratory evidence that human beings
do not play games in the way that game theory, founded on the assumption
of individual rationality, predicts they will. Unlike in non-strategic, decision-
theoretic contexts, a violation of \rational play" in game-theoretic contexts
can be dissected into two broad categories: (1) a deliberate use on the part
of a player of non-sel¯sh and pro-(or, for that matter anti)-social considera-
tions, and (2) a failure to do one's strategic calculations correctly. Laboratory
experiments with choice in games, as opposed to ordinary decision-making,
allows us to dissect between the above two reasons for deviation from stan-
dard theory. This paper reports on a set of experiments designed by us
especially to di®erentiate between these two reasons for deviation.
Such an exercise has important implications for policymaking and the
analysis of welfare. The non-uniqueness of the relation between perceptions
of welfare and actions chosen was analysed in a celebrated paper by Pattanaik
(1968), and is also the subject of several papers by Sen (see, in particular,
Sen, 1977). One of the earliest works demonstrating the close connection
between game-theoretic decision-making and group welfare was Pattanaik
(1978). If human deviations from the predictions of standard economics were
caused entirely by the fact of a player treating the payo®s di®erently from
the ones represented in the game because of social, altruistic or other such
considerations, there would be less of a case for third party intervention than
if the deviations were caused by a systematic failure to do one's strategic
calculations right. In the former case we would simply have to admit that
an individual's own perception of his or her welfare is di®erent from that of
the analyst's, and most analysts in such contexts would be willing to have
the analyst's perception of welfare be over-ruled by the actual individual's
perception of his or her welfare. But that would not be so compelling in con-
texts where individuals could be shown to be demonstrably prone to ignoring
relevant strategic considerations.
The game that we use to study the above problem is the Traveler's
Dilemma (Basu, 1994, 2007). This game (henceforth, TD) is an example
of a strategic setting where the assumption of rationality commonly made in
mainstream economics produces counter-intuitive predictions, both because
of the complexity of the strategic decision analysis and because pro-social
preferences can pull one away from sel¯sh behavior. Before discussing this,
let us brie°y recall the game. In the original version of the TD, two players
2must individually choose an integer between 2 and 100, without communi-
cating with each other. If both players choose the same number, they get a
payo® equal to that number. If they choose di®erent numbers, the player who
chooses the lower number gets that number plus a bonus (+2, in the original
story), while the player who chooses the higher number gets the lower num-
ber minus a penalty (¡2, in the original story). It is easy to verify that the
only Nash equilibrium in this game is where both players make the minimum
claim of 2. This is true even when mixed strategies are allowed. Further,
(2;2) is also the only trembling hand perfect equilibrium, the only strict
equilibrium, and the only rationalizable outcome. Yet, most people on intro-
spection feel that they would play it di®erently. Moreover, when the game
has actually been tested experimentally, people have consistently rejected the
Nash equilibrium choice (Capra et al., 1999; Becker, Carter and Naeve, 2005;
Rubinstein, 2006, 2007; Chakravarty, Dechenaux and Roy, 2008). Indeed, by
rejecting the rational choice, agents end up obtaining larger rewards.
Capra et al. (1999) ¯nd that, in contrast to theoretical predictions, the
size of the bonus-penalty matters: if it is small, claims converge to the maxi-
mum claim; if it is large, claims converge to Nash Equilibrium. Becker et al.
(2005) show that, even when the TD is played by experts, so that ignorance of
(introspective) backward induction can be ruled out, average claims are much
higher than the Nash equilibrium. Expected claims are also higher than in
the Nash equilibrium, so that it is rational not to play the Nash equilibrium
outcome. This seems to suggest the problem lies with the iterated use of
rationality that is entailed by rationality being common knowledge. As this
may suggest, the TD raises both an experimental and a theoretical question.
The latter asks the following: Even if both players were fully rational and
this was common knowledge, does this have to imply that the outcome will
be the Nash equilibrium? This theoretical question has also given rise to a
lot of discussion and controversy and remains largely unresolved (see Basu,
2000; Colombo, 2003; Zambrano, 2004; Brandenburger, 2007). Much of this
theoretical literature is predicated on the assumption that players choose
strategically not to play the Nash strategy and that such deviations, despite
appearing otherwise, are rational.
The question we address in the present paper is however the practical one:
How do ordinary individuals actually choose? We present an experimental
analysis based on a novel 2x2 design, where the own and the other subject's
bonus-penalty parameters are changed independently, either symmetrically,
as in the standard TD, or asymmetrically. This allows us to shed light on the
3result that the size of the theoretically irrelevant bonus-penalty matters in
practice. More generally, it allows us to explore the determinants of strategic
behavior in a one-shot TD and separate out strategic and altruistic reasons
for deviating from Nash behavior.
We ¯nd that a joint change in own and other subject's bonus-penalty
has a large and signi¯cant e®ect on claims, thus extending to a one-shot
setting the result in Capra et al. (1999) for a repeated game. A change
in the other subject's bonus-penalty has a signi¯cant but relatively small
e®ect on claims when the own bonus-penalty is low, while it has no net
e®ect when the own bonus-penalty is high. On the contrary, a change in
own bonus-penalty has a large and signi¯cant e®ect on claims, for both low
and high level of opponent's bonus-penalty. Comparing directly the two
asymmetric treatments, a change in own bonus-penalty has a signi¯cantly
larger e®ect on claims than a change in other's bonus-penalty. This suggests
that players do not take full account of strategic considerations. We also
examine subjects' beliefs and their reported strategies, as provided in a post-
experimental questionnaire. We ¯nd that, in the asymmetric treatments,
expected claims are not consistent with actual claims. Finally, focusing on
reported strategies, our ¯ndings document that changes across treatments
are to a large extent driven by risk aversion.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
design, the hypotheses to be tested and the procedures. Section 3 presents
the results at the aggregate level. Section 4 provides an interpretation of
the results, examining the data at the individual level, subjects' beliefs and
reported strategies. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the main ¯ndings
and the implications of the analysis.
2 Experimental design and procedures
The baseline game is a standard TD with a set of parameters similar to the
one in Capra et al. (1999), in order to ease comparability. Two subjects must
individually choose an integer between 80 and 200, without communicating
with each other. If both subjects make the same claim, they will each obtain
a number of points equal to that claim. If they make di®erent claims, the
player who makes the lower claim obtains a number of points equal to the
lower claim plus a bonus, while the player who makes the higher claim obtains
a number of points equal to the lower claim minus a penalty (see Appendix
41 for the instructions).
The experiment is based on a design in which the treatment variables
are the own and the other subject's bonus-penalty parameters (henceforth
indicated by R and e R, respectively). We vary the two treatment variables
independently, setting their values at 10 and 80, thus obtaining four treat-
ments in a 2x2 design, as described in table 1.1 This design allows us to
distinguish between the direct (net) e®ects of the treatment variables (R and
e R) and their interactive e®ects.
Table 1 about here
2.1 Hypotheses
Under the assumptions that all agents are rational, and that rationality
is common knowledge, the theoretical prediction, according to the familiar
backward induction argument (see Priest, 2000), would be that both players
choose the minimum feasible number, namely, 80, in all treatments. The
exact size of both R and e R is irrelevant, as long as they are greater than 1.
If we drop these assumptions of full rationality or, more minimally, the com-
mon knowledge of full rationality, independent changes in R and e R allow to
distinguish between conditional and unconditional behavior. In the former
case, agents try to formulate an expectation about the other player's claim
and maximize their expected payo® accordingly. Their claims can therefore
be a®ected by changes in either R or e R. In the case where the agents disre-
gard strategic thinking, they maximize their own payo® taking as given the
other player's strategy, unmindful of the fact that a change in e R can alter
the other player's behavior. Their claims can be a®ected only by changes in
R, whereas changes in e R should be irrelevant.
Let us de¯ne ¹i as the mean claim in treatment i. The experiment is
designed to test the following hypotheses:
H1. E®ect of a change in both own and other subject's bonus-penalty:
H0 : ¹2 = ¹1 vs H1 : ¹2 < ¹1 (1)
The null hypothesis is the irrelevance of a joint increase in R and e R,
versus the alternative hypothesis of a negative e®ect on claims. This
1Note that treatments 3 and 4 are identical between subjects, whereas they are di®erent
within subjects.
5hypothesis, rejected by Capra et al. (1999) in a similar setting with
repeated interaction, is tested here in a one-shot setting and is used as
a benchmark.
H2. E®ect of a change in other subject's payo® only. The null hypothesis is
the irrelevance of an increase in e R, versus the alternative of a negative
e®ect on claims. This hypothesis can be tested under two scenarios for
the own bonus-penalty:
H2a. Keeping constant low R:
H0 : ¹3 = ¹1 vs H1 : ¹3 < ¹1 (2)
This test assesses the gross e®ect of an increase in e R. Rejection of
the null hypothesis provides an indication of conditional behavior.
H2b. Keeping constant high R:
H0 : ¹2 = ¹4 vs H1 : ¹2 < ¹4 (3)
This test evaluates the net e®ect of an increase in e R, allowing for
the interaction with R.
H3. E®ect of a change in own bonus-penalty only. The null hypothesis is
the irrelevance of an increase in R, versus the alternative of a negative
e®ect on claims. As above, this hypothesis can be tested under two
scenarios for the other subject's bonus-penalty:
H3a. Keeping constant low e R
H0 : ¹4 = ¹1 vs H1 : ¹4 < ¹1 (4)
This test assesses the gross e®ect of an increase in R. Rejection
of the null hypothesis is consistent with either conditional or un-
conditional behavior.
H3b. Keeping constant high e R
H0 : ¹2 = ¹3 vs H1 : ¹2 < ¹3 (5)
This test examines the net e®ect of an increase in R, allowing for
the interaction with e R.
6H4. E®ect of change in own versus other subject's bonus-penalty:
H0 : ¹4 = ¹3 vs H1 : ¹4 6= ¹3 (6)
The null hypothesis is that changes in R and e R have the same e®ect
on claims versus the alternative of di®erent e®ects. This test provides
a direct comparison of the e®ects of the own and the other subject's
bonus-penalty.
2.2 Procedures
We ran four sessions, with 24 subjects participating in each session, for a total
of 96 subjects. We used a within-subjects design, so that in every session
each subject played the four treatments in four sequential phases. Subjects
knew that only one phase would be drawn randomly to determine payo®s.
The e®ect of repetition was controlled for by the randomization of treatments
within sessions. Subjects were informed that they would never interact more
than once with the same subject, in order to avoid strategic incentives. In
addition, subjects only received feed-back about the outcomes of each phase
at the end of the four phases, in order to minimize the e®ects of learning and
avoid cross-subject dependence.
Beliefs about opponents' claim were elicited as a surprise question after
the implementation of the four treatments. Subjects could win 5 euros by
correctly guessing the other subject's claim for the selected treatment. A
surprise was necessary so as not to impose subjects to think about what
they expected their opponent to play. We used a point-expectation, rather
than an interval or a distribution, in order to avoid strategic responses.
In each of the four sessions, subjects were randomly assigned to a com-
puter terminal at their arrival. In order to ensure public knowledge, instruc-
tions were distributed and read out aloud. Sample questions were distributed
to ensure understanding of the experimental instructions. Answers were pri-
vately checked and, if necessary, explained to the subjects. The experiment
did not start until all subjects had answered all questions correctly.
The experiment was conducted in the Experimental Economics Labora-
tory of the University of Milan Bicocca in April 2008. Participants were
undergraduate students of Economics recruited by e-mail using a list of vol-
untary potential candidates. Sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes. No
show-up fee was paid and the exchange rate was 10 points = 1 euro. Theoret-
ical payments ranged between 0 and 33 euros, actual payments were between
70 and 27 euro, with an average of about 12 euros. The experiment was run
using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
3 Results
Figure 1 displays mean and median claims and expected claims for each
treatment across all phases. Average claims are 174.4 and 115.6 in the 10-10
and 80-80 treatments, respectively. Median claims are 199 and 80, respec-
tively. Average claims are 112.3 and 149.1, respectively, in the 80-10 and
10-80 treatments, while median claims are 80 and 159, respectively. This
preliminary description indicates that a simultaneous change in both own
and other subject's bonus has a large e®ect on claims even in a one-shot
setting. However, in the asymmetric treatments, a change in other subject's
bonus-penalty alone has a relatively small e®ect on claims, while a change in
own bonus-penalty has a much larger e®ect. Indeed, the di®erence between
the symmetric treatments (10-10 and 80-80) can be largely explained by the
change in the own bonus-penalty.
Figure 1 about here
Table 2 reports the corresponding ¯gures for mean and median claims
by individual phases and overall. The table indicates, for all treatments, a
tendency for claims to fall over successive phases, suggesting that learning
may be playing a role even in the absence of feed-backs.
Table 2 about here
Table 3 reports results of sign-rank tests of the null hypothesis of equal
claims between treatments, based on within-subject matched pairs of obser-
vations. The di®erence between the 10-10 and 80-80 treatments (column 1)
is strongly statistically signi¯cant, both overall and within individual phases.
This result con¯rms and extends to a one-shot game without repetition the
¯nding of Capra et al. (1999) under repeated interactions, and also the re-
cent experimental ¯ndings of Chakravarty et al. (2008). This experimental
result is also consistent with the theory of \iterated regret minimization" of
Halpern and Pass (2008).
Result 1: A joint increase in own and other's bonus-penalty has
a large and signi¯cant negative e®ect on claims.
8Table 3 about here
Next, consider the e®ect of a change in the other subject's bonus, keeping
¯xed the own bonus (hypotheses 2a and 2b). The di®erence between the 10-
10 and 10-80 treatments (column 2) is positive and statistically signi¯cant.
On the other hand, comparing the 80-10 and 80-80 treatments (column 5), the
di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant. These results indicate that the other
subject's bonus-penalty has a signi¯cant gross e®ect on claims. However,
when we remove the interaction with the own bonus-penalty, the net e®ect
is not signi¯cant. Note that this ¯nding also implies that the change in the
own bonus-penalty by itself entirely explains the e®ect of a joint change in
own and other's bonus-penalty.
Result 2: An increase in the other subject's bonus-penalty has a
signi¯cant negative e®ect on claims when the own bonus-penalty
is low, whereas it does not have a signi¯cant e®ect when the own
bonus-penalty is high.
The third set of hypotheses refers to the e®ect of a change in own bonus,
for a given level of the other subject's bonus. The di®erence between the
10-10 and 80-10 treatments (column 3) is strongly statistically signi¯cant,
not only overall but also by individual phases. Comparing the 10-80 and
80-80 treatments (column 4), the di®erence is also statistically signi¯cant.
This indicates that, contrary to the other subject's bonus-penalty, the own
bonus-penalty does have a signi¯cant net impact on claims.
Result 3: An increase in the own bonus-penalty has a large
and signi¯cant negative e®ect on claims when the other subject's
bonus-penalty is low and a signi¯cant negative e®ect also when
the other subject's bonus-penalty is high.
Finally, when comparing the two asymmetric treatments (column 6), the
di®erence between the 10-80 and 80-10 treatments is negative and statistically
signi¯cant.
Result 4: A change in one's own bonus-penalty has a signi¯-
cantly larger e®ect on claims than a change in the other subject's
bonus-penalty.
94 Analysis
This section explores what lies behind the results at the aggregate level pre-
sented above. We start by examining agents' beliefs about other subjects'
claims. We then focus on choices and revealed strategies at the individual
level. Finally, we examine the strategies reported by subjects in a post-
experimental questionnaire.
4.1 Beliefs
Table 4 reports mean and median expected claims for each treatment, by
individual phase and overall. Mean and median beliefs by treatment across all
phases are also displayed in the bottom panels of Figure 1. Average expected
claims in the 10-10 and 80-80 treatments are 172 and 110.4, respectively,
while median expected claims are 200 and 80, respectively: the change in
both own and other's bonus has a large e®ect on expected claims, consistently
with the e®ect on claims.
Table 4 about here
The results for the asymmetric treatments are quite surprising. In the
80-10 and 10-80 treatments, average expected claims are 121.4 and 135.9,
respectively (median expected claims are 80 and 130, respectively). If play-
ers had rational expectations, beliefs could be expected to be lower when
the other player's bonus-penalty were high. What we observe is indeed the
opposite: expected claims are higher (lower) when the other player's bonus-
penalty is high (low) and the own bonus-penalty is low (high). In asymmetric
treatments, players do not seem to be able to disentangle their own from the
other player's expected behaviour. Hence, this suggests that the deviation
from the Nash outcome is prompted not by considerations of altruism and
pro-social behavior but by an inability to do strategic analysis and take into
consideration the other player's behavioral response.
Result 5: In the asymmetric treatments, beliefs are not consis-
tent with choices.
This ¯nding does not seem to be due to a general inaccuracy in formulat-
ing expected claims since, as indicated in the next section, the distribution
of the prediction error reveals that expected claims are on average, and in
larger number, correct.
104.2 Individual Choices
Figure 2 displays the distribution of individual claims and expected claims,
by treatments and overall. In order to shed light on subjects' strategies,
we also match actions and beliefs at individual level. Table 5 reports cross-
tabulations for claims (rows) and expected claims (columns), by treatment
and overall. Across the four treatments, 38 per cent of the subjects make
the minimum claim of 80, 25 per cent the maximum claim of 200, while 37
per cent fall within the 81-199 range. As for expected claims, 43 per cent
of players believe that their counterpart will choose the NE claim, while in
34 per cent of the cases the expected claim is 200. The NE combination for
claim and expected claim (80,80) occurs in 32 percent of cases, while the
(200,200) combination occurs in 21 per cent of the cases.
Figure 2 about here
Table 5 about here
When comparing individual treatments, subjects playing 80 and 200 are
8 and 44 per cent, respectively, in the 10-10 treatment, while they are 57
and 13 per cent, respectively, in the 80-80 treatment. The change is indeed
even more pronounced in the 80-10 treatment, where subjects claiming 80
and 200 are 61 and 9 per cent, respectively. It is interesting to observe that
the distributions for the 80-10 and 80-80 treatments are virtually identical.
This con¯rms the ¯nding that the observed change in claims between the
10-10 and 80-80 treatments is entirely attributable to the change in the own
bonus.
Table 6 reports the cross tabulation of observed frequencies obtained by
comparing the 10-10 benchmark treatment with each of the other three treat-
ments, hence providing information about changes in claims across treat-
ments within subjects. The results indicate a tendency towards polarization,
as 25 per cent of the subjects playing 200 in the 10-10 treatment, switched
to 80 in the 80-10 treatment. Only 11 per cent of the subjects played 200
in both the 10-10 and 80-80 treatments. An additional 28 per cent of the
subjects played between 81 and 199 in the 10-10 treatments and switched to
80 in the 80-10 treatment.
Table 6 about here
Figure 3 displays the distribution of prediction errors, de¯ned as the dif-
ference between the own belief and the other subject's choice. Across all
11treatments, beliefs are correct for about 30 per cent of the subjects. Within
treatments, other subjects' claims tend to be overpredicted in the 10-80 treat-
ment and, conversely, underpredicted in the 80-10 treatment. This ¯nding
further illustrates the result that in the asymmetric treatments players do
not disentangle their belief on the other subject' choice from their own be-
haviour (see also the surprisingly similar shape of claims and expected claims
in the asymmetric treatments in Figure 1). One possible interpretation of
this result is that, in a number of cases, agents make choices without formu-
lating an expectation about other subjects' claim. When beliefs are elicited,
ex post, agents use their decisions to formulate their beliefs about other sub-
jects' claims. For an overall evaluation of the reliability of beliefs we must put
together the two above mentioned con°icting facts. On the one hand, beliefs
correct in 30 per cent of the cases and the symmetric distribution of predic-
tion error seem to indicate the accuracy of formulated beliefs. On the other
hand, the overprediction and underprediction described above document a
cognitive bias in the asymmetric treatments.
Figure 3 about here
4.3 Revealed strategies
Table 7 reports the cross tabulation of observed frequencies for subject types.
We identi¯ed subject types on the basis of claims and beliefs as follows.
Subject playing and expecting 80 are de¯ned NASH. Subjects playing slightly
less than the expected claim (between 1 and 5 units) are classi¯ed as strategic
(STRA).2 Subjects claiming the same amount they expect (except for 80,80)
are classi¯ed as team strategic (TEAM). Subjects who claim less than 5
units than expected are de¯ned weakly rational (WEAK), and those who
claim more than the expected bid are de¯ned irrational (IRRA). In general,
we observe that the increase in players' bonus-penalty reduces the violation
of individual rationality or team rational choices and increases Nash rational
outcomes. For example, the (80,80) NE pair occurs only in 4 per cent of cases
in the 10-10 treatment, while in 53 per cent of cases in the 80-80 treatment.
The already evidenced dominance of the player's penalty change over the
counterpart`s penalty change is supported by the fact that the claim-belief
2By reasonably assuming that the distributions of the expected claims are non degen-
erate, players may increase the probability of winning the reward by choosing C < C¤,
where C¤ = Ce ¡ 1. The ¡5 threshold is obviously arbitrary.
12pair is (80,80) in 22 per cent of cases in the 10-80 treatment, while in 49 per
cent of cases in the 80-10 treatment (close to what happens in the 80-80 one).
On the other hand, the team-strategic consistent pair (200;200) occurs in 38
per cent of cases in the 10-10 treatment and in 10 per cent of cases in the 80-80
treatment. Finally, irrational strategies tend to fall when we move from the
10-10 treatment (13 per cent) to treatments with high bonus-penalty (only
1 per cent in the 80-80 treatment). Some subjects appear to play randomly
when consequences are not severe, while they tend to concentrate and use
rationality when monetary consequences are more serious.
Table 7 about here
4.4 Reported Strategies
In this section we examine subjects' ex-post descriptions of their strategies.
Individual declared strategies and the corresponding strategy types are re-
ported in Appendix 2. Although it is di±cult to classify unequivocally self-
reported descriptions, three types of strategies are clearly identi¯able:
1. Conditional: formulate an expectation about the other player's claim,
and play accordingly.
2. Risk-averse: try to minimize possible loss, focusing on the size of the
penalty.
3. Collusive (risk-loving): play high hoping the other also plays high.
Figure 4 displays the distribution of the reported strategies. Players em-
phasizing conditional behavior are about 17 per cent. Strategies based on
collusion and risk aversion are about 17 and 29 per cent, respectively. A fur-
ther 33 per cent declares other strategies which are not clearly classi¯able,
while about 4 per cent does not declare any strategy. Note that conditional
players in many cases just say that they take into account their expectation
on the counterpart's action, while in other cases they add that they will try
to undercut them.
Figure 4 about here
Figure 5 displays average claims by declared strategy type for each of the
four treatments. Figure 6 reports average changes between treatments by
declared strategy type. Subjects whose declared strategies are based on risk
13aversion display the largest negative change between treatments when the
own bonus-penalty is increased. Subjects who reported conditional strategies
display the largest e®ect on claims, as expected, when the other subject's
bonus-penalty is increased. Finally, it is interesting to observe that the claims
of subjects who reported collusive strategies are relatively una®ected when
the own and other subject's bonus-penalty are jointly increased.
Figures 5 and 6 about here
In order to assess the statistical signi¯cance of these treatment e®ects
by reported strategy type, table 8 reports OLS estimates obtained when the
within-subject change between pairs of treatments is regressed against a con-
stant (overall) or against a set of dummy variables for subject types identi¯ed
on the basis of the reported strategies described above (by strategy), in order
to identify the contribution of individual types to the overall change. The
dependent variable in each column is the di®erence between the claims in the
two treatments indicated in the column headings.
Table 8 about here
A relevant ¯nding is the large and signi¯cant negative coe±cient of the
dummy for declared risk aversion in all speci¯cations, with the only exception
of the di®erence between the 80-80 and 10-80 treatments. Risk aversion is
indeed not only the most commonly reported determinant of choices (28 per
cent), but also the strategy associated with the largest e®ects of treatment
variables on claims.
Result 6: Treatment e®ects on claims are largely explained by
risk aversion.
This result is consistent with a standard mean-variance payo® utility
function. A higher bonus-penalty structure expands the payo® range and in-
creases its variance. As a consequence, the reduction of claims will be higher
for individuals with higher risk aversion. Note as well that risk aversion,
combined with non-Nash rationality, may explain the sensitivity of subjects'
claims to changes in the bonus-penalty structure.
The results in table 8 also indicate that the positive change in claims
produced by an increase in the other's subject bonus-penalty, keeping the
own bonus-penalty high, is explained by the behavior of collusive players.
14More generally, it can be observed that collusive players tend to claim less
when the structure of bonus-penalties is asymmetric.
Finally, in order to provide a robustness check, table 9 reports Tobit
estimation results for the same set of speci¯cations, to take into account the
truncated nature of the dependent variables. All the results described above
are qualitatively unchanged.
Table 9 about here
5 Concluding Remarks
The Traveler's Dilemma and other related games, such as the Centipede and
the ¯nitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, suggest that the Nash equilibrium
predictions do not work in contexts where the rationality assumptions are too
demanding and rely on higher order knowledge of the rationality of players.
Once it is experimentally veri¯ed that players frequently deviate from Nash
equilibrium, the natural question that arises is: How do they actually choose?
Are the deviations systematic and can we parse the deviations to gain insights
into individual motivations and cognition?
In order to shed light on the blackbox of the decision process of ordi-
nary human beings, in this paper we pursued three original directions. (i)
We decomposed the bonus-penalty change of Capra et al. (1999) into its
two asymmetric change components. (ii) We used a design under which the
same subject plays di®erent treatments without learning about previous out-
comes. An added value of this approach is its closeness to the ¯rst best of
the comparison of a treatment with the counterfactual: players are subject
to di®erent treatments almost at the same time (in immediately subsequent
phases) without any feedback on previous plays. (iii) We collected players'
expected claims and ex post declared strategies and thereby made it possible
to compare these with their actual plays.
The most relevant ¯ndings of our research can be clustered under four
categories. First, the dominance of the change in one's own bonus-penalty
over the change in the other player's bonus-penalty is such that the former
explains almost all the experimental results of Capra et al. (1999). Hence,
our experiments, taking cue from the work of Capra et al., help isolate and
parse more proximate causes of what prompts deviation from Nash behavior.
This is con¯rmed in many ways (descriptive evidence in mean and median
15claims and expected claims, transition across di®erent treatments, direct
nonparametric tests, etc.).
Second, heterogeneity of players' preferences is supported by observed
claim-belief pairs across di®erent treatments and self-revealed strategies at
the end of the game. We interpret this variability in terms of three di®erent
motivational types{Nash or individually rational, team strategic and irra-
tional. Third, even though 30 per cent of expected claims are correct and
the distribution of the prediction error around the zero mean is symmetric
(suggesting that expected claims were in general carefully formulated), we
document a cognitive bias in asymmetric treatments where claims tend to be
underpredicted in the 80-10 treatment and, conversely, overpredicted in the
10-80 treatment. More simply, it seems that players are not able to distin-
guish fully between their own and their opponent's behaviour, which suggests
an inherent inadequacy in strategic thinking. Fourth, reported strategies help
to explain changes in claims when the penalty-reward structure varies with
respect to the 10-10 benchmark. More speci¯cally, players we classify as risk
averse tend to claim signi¯cantly less and those classi¯ed as collusive do the
same but only in asymmetric treatments.
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18Appendix 1: Instructions
This appendix reports the instructions distributed on paper to the subjects.
Instructions
² Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment.
² During the experiment you are not allowed to talk or communicate in
any way with other participants.
² If at any time you have any questions raise your hand and one of the
assistants will come to you to answer it.
² By following the instructions carefully you can earn an amount of
money that will depend on your choices and the choices of other par-
ticipants.
² At the end of the experiment the number of points that you have earned
will be converted in euros at the exchange rate 10 tokens = 1 euro. The
resulting amount will be paid to you in cash.
General rules
² There are 24 subjects participating in this experiment.
² The experiment will take place in 4 independent phases. At the begin-
ning of each phase instructions for that phase will be distributed.
² In each phase 12 couples of two participants will be formed randomly
and anonymously, so that in each phase you will interact with a di®erent
subject within a couple.
² In each phase the choices that you and the other subject will make will
determine the amount earned.
² The choices that you and the other subject will make, and the corre-
sponding results, will not be communicated to you at the end of each
phase, but only at the end of the whole experiment.
19² At the end of the experiment, only one of the four phases will be ran-
domly drawn, and the earnings of each participants will be determined
on the basis of the selected phase.
PHASE 1,2,3,4
² In this phase you have to choose an integer between 80 and 200.
² At the same time, the subject with whom you have been paired has to
choose an integer between 80 and 200.
² If the numbers chosen are the same, you will both earn a number of
points equal to the number selected.
² If the numbers chosen are di®erent, you will both earn a number of
points equal to the lower of the chosen numbers, plus a bonus or
penalty determined as follows:
{ [Treatment 1]
{ If the number you have chosen is smaller than the number chosen
by the other subject, you will have a bonus of 10 points and
the other subject will have a penalty of 10 points.
{ If the number you have chosen is larger than the number chosen
by the other subject, you will have a penalty of 10 points and
the other subject will have a bonus of 10 points.
[Treatment 2]
{ If the number you have chosen is smaller than the number chosen
by the other subject, you will have a bonus of 80 points and
the other subject will have a penalty of 80 points.
{ If the number you have chosen is larger than the number chosen
by the other subject, you will have a penalty of 80 points and
the other subject will have a bonus of 80 points.
[Treatment 3]
{ If the number you have chosen is smaller than the number chosen
by the other subject, you will have a bonus of 10 points and
the other subject will have a penalty of 80 points.
20{ If the number you have chosen is larger than the number chosen
by the other subject, you will have a penalty of 10 points and
the other subject will have a bonus of 80 points.
[Treatment 4]
{ If the number you have chosen is smaller than the number chosen
by the other subject, you will have a bonus of 80 points and
the other subject will have a penalty of 10 points.
{ If the number you have chosen is larger than the number chosen
by the other subject, you will have a penalty of 80 points and
the other subject will have a bonus of 10 points.
21Appendix 2: Individual Declared Strategies
Conditional
1. I tried to understand the most likely bid made by the opponent, and played
on the basis of my expectation.
2. I tried to guess the most likely bid made by my opponent, and played ac-
cordingly.
3. I tried to maximize my pro¯t by guessing what my colleague could do.
4. Trying to think about the number my partner could play.
5. On the basis of the choice the other player could make.
6. On the basis of the possible choice of the other participants.
7. On the basis of how the other person could play.
8. A choice of 200 would have produced the highest payo® for both subjects. I
always chose 199 (max -1) in order to try to win more than the other. Too
bad the other always played the minimum.
9. I tried to imagine what the other player would do.
10. Given that if I had chosen the highest bid, the penalty would have been
calculated on the lowest bid, it is my interest to choose the lowest number
(so as to get the bonus as well). In this way, if I choose x my opponent has
an interest to choose x-1, and so on up to 80. In these conditions of limited
information the equilibrium is the lowest bid. Even though the optimal
choice for both players is 200, this does not happen as we both have an
incentive to bid 199. This holds above all in the ¯rst 3 phases. In the last
phase, when the bonus-penalty is only 10 points, it is worth taking the risk
of earning 7 instead of 8, while having the possibility to earn the maximum.
11. Try to guess the smaller number relative to the other subject.
12. Thinking about the possible choice of the other player, I made my choices
in order to maximize the number of points.
13. I have tried to ¯gure out the choices made by the other subject.
2214. I tried to imagine my partner's behavior, and what he would imagine about
my behavior.
15. I tried to guess what the other player would play and, in order not to risk, I
choose the minimum bid, as I thought the other subject would do the same.
16. To obtain the most with bonuses and penalties, trying to forecast the other
player's bid.
Collusive
1. I chose the most likely bid, hoping that the others would also choose the
most likely bid rather than gambling.
2. I tried to win the maximum. Therefore I risked to earn nothing in order to
earn as much as possible, hoping that my partner would do the same.
3. Maximum payo®. The optimal strategy would have been 200 in each phase,
so that each participant would earn 20 euro.
4. One should always choose 200, so that both players would obtain the maxi-
mum and there would be no penalty.
5. If all had chosen 200, everyone would have earned the maximum. I relied on
other people's intelligence, who I thought would want to earn the maximum
like me.
6. I always selected the maximum, as the minimum is not worth it. It is better
to gamble.
7. The most risky choice to earn the most.
8. My choices were made on the basis of the belief that the other player would
be intelligent enough to cooperate, but as it seems, my partner was in need
to cash the minimum wage, as he showed the urgent need of small change
in the short term.
9. I played relatively high numbers, thinking that my partner would not be
so stupid and sel¯sh to think only about his earning. Unfortunately, the
opposite occurred. In the next experiment, I will behave accordingly.
2310. Being risk-lover brought me to play large numbers, hoping that my colleagues
would do the same.
11. If both players played 200 they would maximize their payo®.
12. Maximum number of points in all phases.
13. If the bonus was 10, I played 200 or 199, as the bonus was not big enough
to try to underbid the opponent.
14. I tried to maximize the pro¯t of both players, on the basis of game theory,
even though my choice was dominated.
15. Always bid large numbers, slightly below 200, so that if the lowest number
is high we would both earn enough.
16. I tried to maximize earnings for myself and for the other subject.
Risk averse
1. Try to avoid penalty. Avoid risk and prefer a smaller but less risky payo®.
2. I relied on the penalty: the higher the penalty, the lower my bid.
3. My claims were made in order to lose as little as possible.
4. When the penalty was small I chose a high number, whereas when the risk
was high I chose a low number.
5. I tried to guess the number the other person could play, but in any case I
tried to secure a payo® without taking risks.
6. I aimed at the minimum win.
7. In the ¯rst phase I played a high number because the penalty was low.
Thereafter I tried to avoid risks given the high bonus-penalty.
8. I tried to have a safe earning.
9. Caution.
10. Risk only if compensated by a large return, otherwise risk aversion.
2411. I always chose low numbers.
12. The higher the penalty, the lower the bid. The lower the penalty, the higher
the bid.
13. In theory the optimal choice would be 200, but not being sure that everyone
would understand this ¯nesse, it was preferable to aim at a safe gain with
the lowest number to avoid the penalty.
14. My choice was based on the riskiness of each phase. When the penalty was
high I chose a very low number. when the penalty was medium-low, I chose
a slightly higher number.
15. Risk as little as possible to win the experiment, even though in order to
obtain a considerable earning it would be su±cient to choose both 200.
16. I made my choices trying to loose as few points as possible, hoping that the
other subject would make as a minimum the same choice as me.
17. On the basis of the penalty, I tried to risk as little as possible.
18. Minimum risk.
19. When the penalty was low it was worth risking a high bid, but when the
penalty was low it was not worth it.
20. I tried to risk as little as possible, even though if everyone had always played
200 we would all win the maximum.
21. If the penalty is 10 it is worth playing 200, but if the penalty is 80 it worth
playing 80.
22. Safety.
23. When the penalty was high, so that it cause a payo® of zero, I played very
low.
24. I tried to obtain always at least 80 points.
25. Tried to choose a number that allowed me to earn at least 8 euro.
26. When the penalty was low it was worth playing 200, when the penalty was
80 it was worth playing 80.
2527. My choices were based on non-risk.
28. Choices on the basis of earning's certainty.
Other
1. My logic was to bid in order to have a higher payo®
2. Highest win and lowest loss for each subject in each phase.
3. My logic was initially not trying to win too much. Then I wanted to be
greedy as everyone else, I think, and I played the lowest number.
4. Pro¯t maximization.
5. My objective was to win at least 20 euro, so I chose a number small enough
to win the bonus, but not too small so as to be able to win 20 euro.
6. On the basis of bonus and penalty.
7. In the ¯rst phase I bid the maximum (as the penalty was low). Thereafter
I played low numbers, counting on the other player doing the same.
8. Try to maximize pro¯t while obtaining a minimum earning.
9. I always selected a large number to have the possibility of an earning.
10. I tried to chose in some cases the most appropriate choice for me, and in
other cases the most appropriate choice for both of us.
11. Maximum pro¯t.
12. I played trying to obtain a payo® of 20 euro, without taking into account
the other player's loss.
13. Choose 80.
14. I risked by not making the obvious choice of 80 or 200.
15. I risked in all phases.
16. If the bonus was large, I played low.
17. Irrational.
2618. I tried to make choices in my own interest.
19. Ratio between safe earning and maximum possible earning.
20. I tried to maximize my payo® by looking at the bonus in each phase.
21. When the smallest number had a bonus of 80, I always played 80.
22. I did not use a real strategy, I just thought that other participants would
play low, so I played low.
23. Rather random.
24. I reasoned on how I could earn more.
25. Mathematical.
26. Logic-deductive.
27. Very little trust towards an unknown partner.
28. I would receive more bonuses only by underbidding my opponent, and to be
sure of this I could only play the lowest possible number (80).
29. Thinking of the choices of my opponent, trying to limit my losses, and
trusting my opponent when playing high.
30. I made choices so as to obtain equal payo®s with the other subject.
31. I tried to bring home as many euro as possible.
32. I always tried to play low in order to win the bonus.
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30Table 1: Experimental Design
Other subject's bonus-penalty (e R)
Own bonus-penalty (R) §10 §80
§10 Treatment 1 Treatment 3
§80 Treatment 4 Treatment 2
Note: see section 2 for details on the experimental design.
Table 2: Mean and median claims, by treatment and phase
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 All Phases
Means
Treatment 1 (10-10) 174.0 176.5 173.4 173.8 174.4
Treatment 2 (80-80) 140.1 111.9 103.8 106.5 115.6
Treatment 3 (10-80) 158.8 139.1 144.2 154.3 149.1
Treatment 4 (80-10) 116.8 116.3 121.5 94.6 112.3
All treatments 147.4 135.9 135.7 132.3 137.8
Medians
Treatment 1 (10-10) 199.0 199.5 198.5 199.0 199.0
Treatment 2 (80-80) 145.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0
Treatment 3 (10-80) 194.5 150.0 143.5 190.5 159.0
Treatment 4 (80-10) 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0
All treatments 164.5 130.0 120.0 90.0 130.0
Note: Treatment 1: R = §10 e R = §10. Treatment 2: R = §80 e R = §80. Treatment 3:
R = §10 e R = §80. Treatment 4: R = §80 e R = §10.
31Table 3: Tests of equality of claims between treatments, by session and overall
1010 8080 1010 1080 1010 8010 8080 1080 8080 8010 1080 8010
Session 1 4.03 3.00 3.99 -2.75 -1.16 2.55
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.01
Session 2 4.11 0.95 4.10 -3.47 -2.00 3.04
(p-value) 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00
Session 3 3.97 2.24 3.97 -3.24 0.81 3.45
(p-value) 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00
Session 4 2.44 1.80 3.18 0.21 1.90 2.15
(p-value) 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.84 0.06 0.03
All Sessions 7.51 4.05 7.63 -4.86 0.44 5.65
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00
Note: the table reports results of sign-rank tests of the null hypothesis of equal claims
between treatments, based on independent matched observations (within subjects). The
number of observations is 24 at session-level and 96 overall.
Table 4: Mean and median expected claims, by treatment and phase
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 All Phases
Means
Treatment 1 (10-10) 182.8 167.5 169.8 167.8 172.0
Treatment 2 (80-80) 131.6 94.8 107.5 107.5 110.4
Treatment 3 (10-80) 136.3 139.3 132.9 135.2 135.9
Treatment 4 (80-10) 134.5 129.6 122.5 99.2 121.4
All treatments 146.3 132.8 133.2 127.4 134.9
Medians
Treatment 1 (10-10) 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0
Treatment 2 (80-80) 95.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0
Treatment 3 (10-80) 130.0 140.0 115.0 87.5 130.0
Treatment 4 (80-10) 100.0 100.0 85.5 80.0 80.0
All treatments 160.0 118.0 100.0 80.5 118.0
Note: Treatment 1: R = §10 e R = §10. Treatment 2: R = §80 e R = §80. Treatment 3:
R = §10 e R = §80. Treatment 4: R = §80 e R = §10.
32Table 5: Claims and expected claims: cross tabulation
Expected claims
Claims 80 81-199 200 Total
All treatments
80 0.32 0.03 0.03 0.38
81-199 0.08 0.20 0.10 0.37
200 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.25
Total 0.43 0.24 0.34 1.00
Treatment 1 (10-10)
80 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.08
81-199 0.04 0.22 0.22 0.48
200 0.03 0.03 0.38 0.44
Total 0.11 0.29 0.59 1.00
Treatment 2 (80-80)
80 0.53 0.03 0.01 0.57
81-199 0.07 0.19 0.04 0.30
200 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.13
Total 0.63 0.22 0.16 1.00
Treatment 3 (10-80)
80 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.26
81-199 0.13 0.20 0.08 0.41
200 0.07 0.01 0.25 0.33
Total 0.42 0.23 0.35 1.00
Treatment 4 (80-10)
80 0.49 0.03 0.09 0.61
81-199 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.29
200 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09
Total 0.55 0.21 0.24 1.00
Note: the table reports observed frequencies for claims (rows) and expected claims
(columns). Treatment 1: R = §10 e R = §10. Treatment 2: R = §80 e R = §80.
Treatment 3: R = §10 e R = §80. Treatment 4: R = §80 e R = §10.
33Table 6: Claims: tabulations across treatments
80 81-199 200
Treatment 10-10 Treatment 80-80
80 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.08
81-199 0.27 0.20 0.01 0.48
200 0.24 0.08 0.11 0.44
Total 0.57 0.30 0.12 1.00
Treatment 10-10 Treatment 10-80
80 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.08
81-199 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.48
200 0.09 0.09 0.25 0.44
Total 0.25 0.40 0.32 1.00
Treatment 10-10 Treatment 80-10
80 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08
81-199 0.28 0.19 0.01 0.48
200 0.25 0.10 0.08 0.44
Total 0.61 0.29 0.09 1.00
Note: the ¯gures reported are observed frequencies across the 10-10 treatment (rows)
and each of the other treatments (columns).
34Table 7: Subject types: tabulations across treatments
NASH STRA TEAM WEAK MORE Total
Treatment 10-10
NASH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
STRA 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
TEAM 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.44
WEAK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.26
MORE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.13
Treatment 80-80
NASH 0.04 0.07 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.53
STRA 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.06
TEAM 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.15
LESS 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.11
MORE 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.15
Treatment 10-80
NASH 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.22
STRA 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06
TEAM 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.03 0.02 0.30
LESS 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.15
MORE 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.27
Treatment 80-10
NASH 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.11 0.08 0.49
STRA 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03
TEAM 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.15
LESS 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.22
MORE 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.11
Note: the table reports observed frequencies for claims (rows) and expected claims
(columns) for the revealed strategy types identi¯ed in section 4.3.
35Table 8: Di®erences between treatments and strategy types: OLS
8080-1010 1080-1010 8010-1010 8080-1080 8080-8010 8010-1080
Overall -58.9** -25.3** -62.1** -33.5** 3.3 -36.8**
(-10.84) (-4.96) (-11.47) (-5.87) (0.74) (-6.48)
By strategy
Conditional -66.1** -39.4** -71.2** -26.8 5.1 -31.8*
(-5.25) (-3.18) (-5.40) (-1.90) (0.49) (-2.29)
Collusive -25.2* -3.9 -57.7** -21.4 32.5** -53.8**
(-2.06) (-0.32) (-4.51) (-1.56) (3.24) (-4.00)
Risk averse -78.9** -31.0** -76.7** -47.8** -2.2 -45.6**
(-8.13) (-3.26) (-7.56) (-4.42) (-0.27) (-4.27)
Other -61.2** -28.0** -51.3** -33.2** -9.9 -23.3*
(-6.87) (-3.20) (-5.51) (-3.34) (-1.35) (-2.38)
Not available -18.8 0.0 -32.3 -18.8 13.5 -32.3
(-0.74) (0.00) (-1.22) (-0.67) (0.65) (-1.16)
R2 0.62 0.25 0.60 0.29 0.13 0.34
N. of obs. 96 96 96 96 96 96
Note: Dependent variable: di®erence within subjects between treatments. * = p<0.05,
** = p<0.01. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
Table 9: Di®erences between treatments and strategy types: Tobit
8080-1010 1080-1010 8010-1010 8080-1080 8080-8010 8010-1080
Conditional -74.8** -42.3** -81.1** -30.5 5.1 -35.4*
(-4.60) (-3.03) (-4.91) (-1.92) (0.43) (-2.39)
Collusive -20.9 -4.1 -60.3** -18.7 35.4** -57.9**
(-1.87) (-1.14) (-3.52) (-1.40) (2.83) (-3.20)
Risk averse -96.2** -33.1** -95.3** -57.9** -2.1 -54.0**
(-7.02) (-2.76) (-6.73) (-4.62) (-1.00) (-4.67)
Other -68.5** -29.4** -56.7** -38.4** -9.2 -25.9*
(-5.87) (-3.32) (-5.12) (-2.88) (-1.00) (-2.23)
Not available -18.7 0.0 -40.0 -26.0 13.5 -39.7
(-1.15) (0.00) (-1.18) (-0.67) (1.45) (-1.18)
sigma
Constant 60.2** 53.3** 64.5** 65.2** 41.3** 62.6**
(14.37) (10.58) (15.31) (10.32) (7.95) (12.58)
N. obs. 96 96 96 96 96 96
Note: Dependent variable: di®erence within subjects between treatments. * indicates
p-value <0.05, ** indicates p-value <0.01. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
36